

REPORTED UNOFFICIALLY TO THE EMPEROR ON 14 Nov. 1941.

Outline of the Latest Developments of Japanese-American Negotiations

1. Instruction sent to Ambassador NOMURA.
2. Progress of negotiations in Washington
 - a. Nov. 7 NOMURA-HULL Conversation
 - b. Nov. 10 NOMURA-ROOSEVELT Conversation
3. Developments in Tokyo
 - a. Nov. 10 Talk between Foreign Minister TOGO and the U.S. Ambassador
 - b. Nov. 11 Talk between Foreign Minister TOGO and the British Ambassador

1. Instruction sent to Ambassador NOMURA:

Japan's counter-proposal on Japanese-American negotiations, on which an Imperial decision was received in the presence of the Emperor on November 5th, was dispatched on the same day to Ambassador NOMURA by telegram. In view of the negotiations, which had already lasted half a year since its commencement, Japan has been making concession after concession, bearing the unbearable, in order to reach a compromise quickly. In spite of this, America has not only shown no friendly reaction but held firmly to her original opinion. It is because of our sincerest desire to maintain peace that we have thus made difficult concessions, displaying our sincerity to the utmost. However, there is a limit to our patience. If our existence and prestige are at stake, we must defend them if necessary regardless of the sacrifice. Should the U.S. still take an attitude to disregard our position, we shall have to consider that there is no ground left for further negotiation. With the negotiation approaching its final stage, we have instructed him to notify the U.S. that she should take proper measures by reconsidering the situation from a broader viewpoint upon the present situation that does not permit of even a day's delay.

2. Negotiations in Washington.

- a. Meeting between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull (Nov. 7.)

Ambassador NOMURA, accompanied by Minister WAKASUGI, called on Secretary of State Hull and explained carefully Japan's position

and determination. He was also under instruction to reach a compromise at the earliest date possible on the three chief pending questions. Among the three main pending questions, i.e., non-preferential treatment of commerce, Tripartite Pact and withdrawal of troops, the first two could roughly be brought to a compromise by our present proposal. Regarding the stationing of the troops, we earnestly wish that in view of a maximum concession made by Japan, in spite of great hardships, U.S. would take a far-sighted view of the prevailing situations from a broader standpoint.

To this, Secretary of State Hull, after reading our counter-proposal, is reported to have answered to the following effect:

The question of non-preferential treatment is acceptable. As to the stationing of the troops, he simply asked in what proportions the withdrawal and the stationing will be made. Regarding the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Pact he stated that they would give an answer in due course after studying the question.

Further, on this occasion, the Secretary of State asked, as his personal question, what Japan would think, if the highest authorities of China should pledge her friendship and confidence to the Japanese Government as well as to its nation and wish for the restoration of friendly relationship between Japan and China. He wished it to be conveyed to the Japanese Government to inquire about its intention.

This proposal may be interpreted as hinting at the U.S.'s intention of leaving the question of the withdrawal of troops in China to a direct negotiation between Japan and China, since this has been the most difficult point in the negotiation. If so, we may be able to get a chance, as has been Japan's wish from the beginning, of solving the China Incident through direct negotiations between Japan and China without any intervention by a third power. We, therefore, instructed Ambassador NOMURA on November 9 that he should take necessary steps to enable us to avail ourselves of this proposal, on condition that the U.S. would delay the execution of items of agreement on questions other than the China question until the making of peace between Japan and China, and that she would, during this period, refrain from actions of assisting CHIANG.

b. Meeting between President Roosevelt and Ambassador NOMURA (Nov. 10)

Ambassador NOMURA met President Roosevelt and explained as follows: Six months have already elapsed since the commencement of Japanese-American negotiations, and during this time, Japan has endured the unbearable and made many concessions. In spite of this, the U. S. Government has strongly adhered to its original

proposal without making any concessions. There are people in our country who entertain doubts as regards the real intentions of the U.S. Therefore, from the viewpoint of earnestly desiring peace, the Japanese Government has made the maximum concession in the three questions which were the most difficult points heretofore in the negotiations.

However, the President did not immediately express agreement or denial. He stated the following only in an abstract manner: At the present time the whole world is in a critical condition because of disturbances caused by acts of aggressions. Our good sense hopes fervently that the world would soon return to the proper course of peace. The object of the U.S. Government lies in exerting its best efforts to bring about peace in the Pacific Ocean areas through the spirit of fair play. I hope that these preliminary conversations will favorably result in becoming the basis of the negotiations. The U.S. expects to check the expansion of war, and establish a permanent peace.

He added in connection with the principle of non-discrimination that the world generally hopes that it would be carried out.

When Ambassador NOMURA stated that the U.S. economic pressure against Japan is exciting the Japanese people, the President said that the people sometimes require a so-called "modus vivendi" in order to live, and that this should be translated "mode of living."

In reference to the above, it is to our surprise and regret that the U.S. Government in this negotiation still continues adhering to the attitude of not emerging from the bounds of preliminary conversations. We keenly felt that this is most unbecoming at the present pressing situation which requires the speedy conclusion of the negotiation. Therefore, on the 11th, instructions were again sent to Ambassador NOMURA ordering him to take steps to try to urge the U.S. Government to deeply reconsider this point. Also, on the 12th, close attention of the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo was also called to this point.

3. Negotiations in Tokyo.

a. Conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo (Nov. 10)

A general exchange of opinions was already carried out with the U.S. Ambassador on the 30th of October, but I met him again on the 10th and stated as follows:

After studying the past progress, what I feel keenly is the insufficient understanding of facts on the part of the U.S. The Japanese-American negotiations have been postponed time and again. In the meantime, we have made as much concessions as possible to the U.S. contentions, regardless of which the U.S. has firmly adhered to her first contentions "without yielding a step. In some points she has even reversed her attitude. Consequently,

there are people on our side who even doubt the sincerity of the U. S. Government, and public feeling will not tolerate any further delay.

I referred to the approaching Diet session and explained the urgency of the situation. I strongly requested that the U.S. Government solve the problem at a single stroke from a wide point of view, and explained point by point our last (T. N. Saigo-an) proposal. I also emphasized the following effect: In some cases, economic pressure can result in offering a deeper threat than that by force of arms. Also, in regard to the China problem, for Japan, it is tantamount to suicide to tamely accept terms which ignore the results of four and a half years' of sacrifice. Since public opinion would never allow this, I fervently hope that the U.S. would consider this point fully.

I requested him to transmit the above to his Government. The U.S. Ambassador replied that he would cable the above to his Government immediately as he, too, has the desire to exert all his efforts for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations.

b. Conversation with the British Ambassador in Tokyo (Nov 11)

On both the 29th and 30th of October, I also explained in detail to the British Ambassador, Craigie, the necessity of an immediate satisfactory conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation. I heard that the Ambassador reported the above to his Government. When I met the Ambassador on November 11, he referred to it, so I stated the following effect:

Negotiations have already entered the main phase, and now by submitting (T. N. Asigo-Teki) Japan's counter-proposal of a final nature, it has now entered the final phase. It would be proper for Britain to cooperate so as to guide the negotiations to success. If the U.S. accepts our proposal, the signing is possible within a week to ten days. And, if unfortunately, the U.S. rejects this, there is no possibility of continuing the negotiations. Besides, our domestic situation is such that it will not allow further delay in this negotiation. Since there should be methods for a speedy and satisfactory conclusion, depending upon the attitudes of the U.S. and Britain, I hope that the British Government would also give the above matter her fullest consideration and exert efforts for the speedy conclusion of this negotiation.

The ambassador seemed to have had the impression that this negotiation was still in the preliminary stage, and through my explanation, he seemed to have become aware for the first time of the urgency of the situation. He left after replying that he wishes to exert his best efforts in cooperating for a break in the deadlock.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of (11) pages, dated 14 November, 1941, and described as follows: OUTLINE OF THE RECENT PROGRESS ON U.S.-JAPANESE NEGOTIATION. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe

Chief, Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ Henry Shimojima

NAME

Witness: /s/ J. G. Lambert

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

19. 10. 1996 (1996-10-19) 10:00 (1996-10-19 10:00)

第二章 亂世中的一個重要組織

自秦以來，漢室、隋唐、宋、明、清、

升機子

• 1 雷雨(节选) 余华

W. Smith's "The Merchant."

... + 57 + 57

卷之三

P. 1247

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE CULTURE OF THE CHINESE ON THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 11

「新」人體解剖學

جذب

99.5 Ave. N. 3105 (4)

1931. 9. 26.

一、華語讀心真言

(甲) 聲音不準 (乙) 語體錯誤 (丙) 亂說

聲音不準：對於「聲音不準」這項，我們在「讀心真言」的
「乙」項中，已經有詳細的說明，這裡就不再重複。我們只將
「乙」項中與「聲音不準」有關的幾點，再重複一遍，就是：

(1) 聲音的特質：三國條約反覆重複，而且說得
非常之嚴密，日本人以為聲音的不準，就是說不
得，所以聲音的不準，就是說得，這就是「聲音不
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聲音的特質。這就是說，聲音的不準，就是說得。

聲音的特質：聲音的不準，就是說得，這就是「聲音不準」，
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(乙) 亂說

(丙) 華語的口音和：口音和：口音和：口音和：口音和：
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I.P.S. Doc. No. 3105 (4)

卷之四

國際檢察系同 第三十一卷 (乙)
由臺灣政府主辦 論文用

一千九百四十六年一月二十六日

東京二三子四百一

舊藏官吏署名欄 林聲一 HAYASHI 署名捺印

有，有，公的資格 文音無三

人 滝部義郎 / K. URABE (著者)

俗人手稿

一九四四年正月二十六日

東坡之於之雲何者

(A = -1, 2, 3, 4) \ Henry SHIMOJIMA // 2010 //

國學大成·經部·詞曲·卷四

44 H. 25-1318-1 J.G. LAMBERT // 866

P.7

INFORMAL REPORT TO EMPEROR OF Nov. 20, 1941.

The other day I reported to you the summary of the details of the negotiations conducted at Washington and Tokyo subsequent to the despatch of the Imperial (T.N. Japanese) Government's instructions (5th). Today, however, I shall report to you the subsequent developments.

Talks were held four times, viz. on the 12th, 15th, 17th and 18th, but as it just so happened that Ambassador KURUSU arrived at Washington on the 15th, the said Ambassador participated also in the negotiations on both the 17th and 18th, together with Ambassador NOMURA.

(1) Parley between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull of the 12th.

Notwithstanding the fact that the 11th fell on Armistice Day, the U.S. State Department deliberated the whole day on the proposal submitted by our side (T.N. Japan), and on the 12th Secretary of State Hull handed the following two notes to Ambassador NOMURA (accompanied by Minister NAKASUGI) who visited him on the 12th, viz. (A) A note expressing the desire of having our (T.N. Japanese) new Cabinet also confirm the opinion manifested to the U.S. Government by the KONO Cabinet on August 28 in regard to the Pacific policy entertained by it, as well as (B) A note confirming Secretary of State Hull's personal suggestion made to Ambassador NOMURA on the 7th in regard to the China Problem, viz. the proposal of having both Japan and China mutually exchange oaths for the sake of establishing truly amicable and cooperative relations. On that occasion he (Hull) appears to have orally hinted his intention of acting as a mediator between Japan and China. Furthermore, in regard to the stationing of troops in China, the Secretary of State expressed his opposition to the permanent or indefinite stationing of troops, and he is said to have repeatedly criticized Hitlerism by stating that, as for the Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Pact, it was inconsistent for Japan to stand in alliance with Germany on one hand while advocating a Pacific policy on the other, and that there would no longer be any need for Japan to remain in the Tripartite Pact in the event of a Pacific Ocean Peace Agreement being conducted.

With regard to the foregoing, the Government made Ambassador NOMURA reply that, as for (A), the items regarding which the U.S. desires confirmation are all embodied in our Proposal and that the present Government also has no objection in confirming same in the spirit thereof; however, the satisfactory conclusion of the present negotiations should be made the preamble, so that it would be obvious that not our side only (T.N. Japan) should suffer any restraint in the event of the negotiations ending, by any chance, in a rupture. As for (B) the said Ambassador was instructed to be on his strict guard not to bring about a delay in the negotiations by complicating the situation thereby as same was accepted (T.N. for consideration) by our side from the standpoint of bringing about a break in the deadlock.

(2) Parley between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull of the 15th.

Secretary of State Hull presented two notes relative to the question of Commerce. Of these, (A) expatiates on the point that, whereas our Final Proposal (T.N. Saigo-an) (Proposal A) stated "In the event of the Principle of Non-Discrimination being applied throughout the entire world, the enforcement of this principle in the entire Pacific area, also including China, is approved," it is desired that, by taking into consideration the U.S. policy of endeavoring to remove trade barriers, Japan also withdraws the stipulation regarding "Application throughout the Entire World, etc." as the United States cannot hold itself responsible for countries outside of its own jurisdiction.

Proposal "B" is styled the "Proposal re Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration regarding Economic Policy" and is made up of the three parts of (1) General Policy, (2) Japan-U.S. Relations, and (3) Policy for the Pacific Area. (1) states that both Japan and the U.S. should cooperate in restoring the freedom of commerce throughout the world, (2) stipulates the restoration of normal relations between the two nations in regard to commerce, finance and economy, and the concluding of a commercial treaty, whereas (3) specifies that full control rights should be returned to China in regard to economy, finance and currency; preferential or monopolistic rights shall not be acquired in China; and that the joint economic exploitation of China shall be engaged in through the cooperation of the Powers. After receiving the foregoing, Ambassador NOMURA promised to transmit same to his Government, at the same time drawing the attention of the U.S. side to the fact that it was improper to consider the present negotiations as being still in the stage of Preliminary Talks inasmuch as same had already entered into the main stage. Against this the Secretary of State is said to have strongly persisted in his stand that they were still Preliminary Talks and that it would be more proper to enter upon Japan-U.S. negotiations after first of all discovering the basis for negotiations through the preliminary talks between Japan and America and consulting with interested nations like Britain, Netherlands and China, etc.

On that occasion, Ambassador NOMURA is said to have done his utmost in explaining that a Japan-U.S. Agreement and the Tripartite Pact would not be conflicting as the Secretary of State repeated his suspicions regarding Japan's peaceful intentions and went on to dwell on the Tripartite Pact by repeatedly expressing his strong desire to have the said Pact made extinct or a dead letter as there should be no need for Japan to preserve it in the event of a Japan-U.S. Agreement becoming concluded. In brief, the United States assumed the attitude that the views of the U.S. regarding the other pending questions, viz. the Tripartite Pact and the problems of stationing troops would be presented after receiving our reply to the aforementioned two notes.

With regard to the aforesaid two notes, Ambassador NOMURA was instructed to reply to the U.S. that, as regards "Application throughout the Entire

World, etc.," inasmuch as it is our desire to have the said principle applicable uniformly throughout the entire world, we have made it our condition to agree to the enforcement of the said principle also in China in sympathy with the realization of the said desire, so that, by taking into account the fact that this principle is being practically ignored at the present day, we cannot agree to same being made applicable at first only to China. As for Proposal (B), by utilizing the fact that this is styled a tentative plan also by the U.S., we have instructed Ambassador NOMURA to have the U.S. withdraw same completely and to arrange with the U.S. authorities to expedite the negotiations on the basis of our Final Proposal (T.N. Saizo-an), especially on the ground that the various clauses dealing with the Pacific Area ignore the actual conditions in China, and especially as Clause 3 (the proposal regarding Joint Exploitation of China) is liable to become the first step toward International Control of China.

(3) Parley between Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull of the 17th.

Accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, Ambassador NOMURA first of all visited Secretary of State Hull, and after a meeting of about 30 minutes, all of them had an interview with President Roosevelt.

It is reported that on Ambassador KURUSU explaining that a clash between Japan and the U.S. would not be beneficial to anyone, the President concurred with this view and stated that the situation could be saved by formulating a general understanding. On the said Ambassador furthermore emphasizing Japan's peaceful intentions and explaining her (T.N. Japan's) position as regards the Tripartite Pact, as well as the difficulties centering around the question of stationing of troops, to this, the President is said to have replied that he had heard about the difficulties regarding the China problem and that the U.S. has no intention of interfering or assisting in the matter but is merely desirous of becoming only an introducer. During the meeting, which lasted as long as an hour and a quarter, the President is said to have displayed a friendly attitude, but materially no special compromise was seen.

(4) Parley between Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU and Secretary of State Hull of the 18th.

Secretary of State Hull emphasized the menace of Hitlerism, adding that the peace policy of the U.S. was incompatible with same and that, inasmuch as it would be most difficult to adjust the U.S.-Japan relations as long as Japan joins hands with Germany, it was impossible to make any progress in the parleys between Japan and the U.S. without first of all eliminating this basic obstacle. Both Ambassadors gave their replies as deemed fit to the occasion and as there would be no limit to discussions on such a basic problem at a time when conditions had become so tense, both Ambassadors proposed on their own, with a view to planning to alleviate the situation in the Southwest Pacific, to have conditions restored as they were prior to the enforcement of the Freezing Act, by Japan withdrawing her troops from French Indo-China and by the U.S. rescinding the Freezing Act.

After being prevailed on in turn by both Ambassadors, the Secretary of State is said to have replied that, in the event of it being made clear that the heads of the Japanese Government are truly earnest in pursuing a pacific policy, he did not mind seizing this opportunity to persuade Britain and the Netherlands, etc. to restore conditions to the days prior to the enforcement of the Freezing Act. He (T.N. Secretary of State Hull) remarked that it was necessary, however, for the political conditions in Japan to proceed toward an increasingly peaceful trend.

Against the foregoing, both Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU expressed the opinion that, at this time, when the United States was about to venture on the Atlantic War by revising the Neutrality Act, it would be most advantageous for Japan to evade a rupture in the Japan-U.S. relations and prepare herself for future activities by pulling herself out of the present crisis by standing aloof from the theater of war. However, by concluding that the various circumstances made the Tentative Plan of both Ambassadors insufficient to ensure the safety of Japan's position, the Government instructed both Ambassadors at midnight of the 19th to immediately present to the U.S. authorities the Proposal "B" that was decided on at the meeting held in the Imperial presence the other day.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

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Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe

Chief, Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ Henry Shimojima

NAME

Witness: /s/ J. G. Lambert

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

日米文書經過概要

(二二三)

外機密

過日八帝國政府訓令發出(五日)ニ引領キ華府及東京
ニ於行心マシル交渉経緯ヲ概要御説明シテ
本日八其后、経過ヲ御報告申シテ了ス。
会談ハ十二日十五日十七日及十八日四回行ハシラカ恰
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十八丙同大使ニ野村大使ト共ニ交渉ニ参加致シテ
居ラス。

(一)十二日野村大使ハル長官会談
十一日休戦記念日ニ当リトニ拘ラス本國國務省ハ
我方、提示セラ事ニ終日審議セリ中、ハル長官
ハ十三日往訪セル野村大使(若松公使帶同)ニ行ニ
通、文書即(甲)八月平合近衛内閣ニ其把懷ス平
和的政策ニ關シ米國政府ナシテ表明セル見解ヲ
我新内閣ニ於テモ確認アリテ旨ヲ認ムハル文書及
(乙)十七日ハル長官ナシテ同題ニ關シ野村大使計
ナシテ専シ個人的提言即日大丙國々眞友邦協
力關係ニ樹立スル事相互ニ誓約ノ交換スニ案ヲ認ム
ハル文書ヲ手交シテ、其際附ニ日本民間橋渡シヲ
スル意アリ、如口吻ヲ減ラシテ趣下アリハ尚長官

八支那駐兵問題=開港八永久乃至無期限駐兵反対、
並、日俄伊三國條約付下、日本カ一方=平和的政策、
標榜シテ之方が與上問題關係ニ立ツ、實質ニテ太
平洋平和協定成立セハ日本ハ三國條約ニ備アル心事
ナリヘド並ヘ類リ=シドラ、主義、論點シテ由ノ
御座居ス。

右ニ付シマシテハ政府ハ野村大使ニ付シ(甲)付下ハ米側
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訓令致シマシ。

(十五)野村大使ハル長官會議

ハ長官ハ通商問題=開港ニ通、文書ヲ根示
シマシテ(甲)ハ我方最後案(甲案)ニ於テハ無差別
原則、全世界ニ適用セラヒルモナリニ於テハ太平洋
全世界即支那ニ於テモ本原則、行ハルコトヲ承認
シトアリクルニ付シテ米國トシテハ皆無國以外、國ニ
付シ責任ヲ負シ得サルヲ以テ通商清障ヲ除去シ
タル米國政策ニ鑑ミ日本側ニ於テモ全世界適用

云々、條件、撤回アリ。キヨラ律述アリ。アリ。②、經濟
政策案、閣入ル日本再開宣言案、閣入ル。①、一般政
策案、日本開港案、(二)、經濟政策案、閣入ル。三者合
議、(一)、官本位國、即ち、官吏、官員、通商自由、
由、恢復、計。②、八國團、通商、經濟及經濟
上、正常關係恢復、通商條件約、歸、事、擬定。
③、經濟財政通貨、閣入ル。完全、統制權、支
那、逐塊、八千下、支那、於此、侵入、內、外、統治、占領
權利、獲得、並、上、列國、協力、於此、那、經濟
共同開發、行。下、詳記載、之、二、三、四、五、六、七、八。

野村人使（右）受領（政府）西本年三月八日今次交涉爲本格的交涉或今月（八月）從今起之豫備的會議上觀（不當）上付朱側注意喚起已（長官）差遣（日本）向豫備的會議（交涉）其（交涉）見（不）（後之）（代）（國）（保）（國）（久）（英）（深）（交）（等）（該）（其）（上）（之）（不）（交）（涉）（移）（合）（上）（安）（當）（不）（起）（旨）（不）（飽）（迄）（豫）（備）（的）（會）（議）（起）（前）（國）（難）（之）（起）（不）（入）（其）（長）（官）（日本）（軍）（總）（參）（團）（國）（難）（國）（難）（逐）（三）（國）（條）（約）（三）（國）（條）（約）（成）（立）（日本）（三）（國）（條）（約）（保）（持）（心）（要）（五）（八）（右）（消）（不）（若）（死）（天）（元）（日）（故）（旨）（反）（覆）（力）（說）（之）（依）（野）（村）（不）（便）（極）（力）（日）（本）（協）（定）（三）（國）（條）（約）（極）（端）（見）（次）（次）（說）（明）（多）（趣）（不）（入）（要）（不）（側）（前）（顯）（又）（書）（付）（不）（答）（候）（代）（懸）（不）（即）（三）（國）（條）（約）（不）（江）（兵）（門）（題）（國）（米）（側）（意）（向）（回）（不）（入）（能）（度）（大）（子）（外）（不）（引）（不）

右二文書付（野村人使）（甲）（全）（文）（書）（用）（不）（代）（方）（於）（不）（同）（原）（則）（全）（世）（界）（三）（種）（通）（用）（不）（也）（不）（有）（不）（有）（不）（有）（不）（現）（順）（應）（不）（支）（那）（於）（不）（石）（原）（則）（行）（化）（不）（承）（認）（不）（意）（味）（含）（條）（件）（不）（也）（不）（也）（不）（現）（今）（本）（原）（則）（不）（無）（限）（也）（已）（居）（不）（实）（雖）（支）（那）（不）（不）（不）（見）（之）（不）（通）（用）（不）（化）（不）（人）（承）（服）（難）（不）（自）（米）（側）（三）（國）（信）（方）（訓）（令）（乙）（付）（不）（等）（大）（平）（洋）（地）（城）（於）（不）（政）（策）（各）（道）（支）（那）（現）（不）（無）（限）（不）（破）（其）（三）（項）（支）（那）（共）（同）（問）（題）（案）（反）（部）（国）（際）（管）（理）（不）（確）（不）（惧）（不）（認）（不）（改）（本）（案）（不）（於）（不）（非）（公）（式）（付）（不）（解）（不）（居）（不）（利）（用）（不）（全）（部）（撤）（回）（不）（我）（最）（後）（不）（全）（破）（不）（交）（涉）（促）（進）（不）（計）（不）（稱）（不）（側）（申）（入）（不）（不）（引）（不）

(三)十七日野村、赤松兩大使、口久(心)大統領、長官會談

(四) 由野村、奉酒人便、化長官令設

明ニ化於于右機縁上長官英、蘭等諸國連合
実施前、狀能復帰差支ノ但ノニ依リ日本、政情益々
平和的傾向向ニ有リト肝要リト答々趣ナリス。
在國野村、末柳兩大使ヨリ米國今ナ中立派改正
ノ大西洋戰爭、來出サ上此際日本ノ、布試案ニ依リ
日米被局回避ノ戰亂、外立ナリ現下、危局切核以
他日、碰飛ニ備ニコト得策トリ、意見具申アリシ
多政於、諸般、情勢ヨリ兩大使、試案ヨリテ、帝
國、立場ヲ安固ラシム足也モト認ナリ十九日深更兩大
使對、過般布前會議決定、乙未至參側、對シ提示
之件、對令教ナリ。

I.R.U. Doc. No. 3105 (5)

證 明 書

「アント文書局」等
國際檢察部 第三。五號(二)

余典據及公正開示證明

余林謙HAYASHI Kaoru、余が下記資格於下節外務省文書司課
長日本政府公的關係在モモナカト達該官吏下
主余が添附セシム十一頁ヨリ成ル一九四一年(昭和十六
年)十一月二十日前下記題名即日本文書經過概要、文書
保管人、證明人。

余更添附、記録及文書由日本政府公文書司課
司長が下記各種、又小部局、公文書司課及外務省
又外務省司長證明人。(右ノ外國者又外國者、日本文書
類又外務省司長證明人、成規所定、公文書司長證明人將記
入)

一九四八年(昭和二十三年)一月二十日

東京於下署名

富該官吏署名欄

右者、公的資格

證人

林HAYASHI 謹啟署名捺印

外務省文書司課署名捺印

浦部勝馬URABE Katsuji 印署名捺印

公的資格

人

公的資格

人

余、開示證明

余、聯合國最高法院總司令部 HENRY SHIMOJIMA 余が聯合國最高法院總司令部
關係在モモナカト達上記題名文書余が下記上日本政府
上記署名者、證明人、證明人。

一九四八年(昭和二十三年)一月二十六日

東京於下署名

氏名欄

右者、公的資格

證人

亨利・シモジマ署名

國際檢察部署名

J. G. LAMBERT